Polish democracy’s key test
The Polish election raises crucial questions about democracy in Poland and Europe
On October 15th, there will be an election in Poland, the right populist PiS party aiming for a third term in government. The vote has unusually high stakes. Following their initial 2015 victory, PiS have attacked liberal democracy. Successive reforms have undermined judicial independence; state television has descended into Fox News style propaganda; cronyism has motivated public appointments. Often, democratic backsliding is exaggerated – many overstate damage to British democracy – but the expert V-Dem dataset returns an unflattering verdict on Poland. Since 2015, liberal democracy has regressed halfway to its level during communism.
We might reflect on the institutional foundations of this process. By the early-2010s, Central and Eastern European (CEE) democracies appeared to have settled into equilibriums. After the end of communism, the influence of international organizations and capital generated pressures for democratization. Though domestic conditions could have been better – rather than liberalism, nationalism is the dominant regional ideology – CEE civil societies had embarked on a democratic trajectory. Ten years ago, liberal democracy seemed established in Poland, the country playing a leading role in the EU and the moderate Civic Platform party dominating politics. These realities underpinned claims that Polish democracy was strong enough to resist PiS.
Whilst such prognoses were mistaken, we might be wary of assertions that democratic backsliding has no bottom. PiS face significant domestic opposition; high proportions of voters distrust the government and opposition is vibrant, the contrast with Hungary being marked. Such resistance echoes historic patterns, communism and neoliberalism finding it difficult to penetrate Polish society, compared to other CEE countries. Poland remains a key EU member state. The European Commission has taken a hard line against authoritarian reforms, initiating legal challenges and suspending Coronavirus support payments. European politicians such as Frans Timmermans have become PiS hate figures.
Intriguingly, European developments may be a key contingency. Though the EU has been a crucial sponsor of democracy in the CEE region, this reflects the liberal-democratic profile of member states. But in two of the five largest member states, Poland and Italy, far-right parties lead governments and in the remaining three, Germany, France and Spain, such parties may soon enter government.
Recently, thought-provoking accounts have argued that a far-right EU may emerge. One notes that the far right has become less Eurosceptic and the centre right more concerned with identity, encouraging cooperation. Another remarks on the pragmatism of a new generation of far-right leaders, such as Giorgia Meloni.
Conceivably, a reverse complementarity may emerge, the EU supporting a drift to authoritarianism. Should Trump win the next US presidential election, the wider context would reinforce this form of integration. At the very least, such an EU would drop sanctions against the Polish government.
But it seems unlikely that all these cards will fall into place. Whilst the far right is on the rise and may increase its influence in the European Council (the inter-governmental organ which sets the EU agenda), this will be far from uncontested. Across Europe, majorities of voters oppose the far right and taboos remain against deals with these parties.
Liberal democracy is in the European Commission’s DNA, reflecting the path dependency of integration. Were the far right to dominate the Council, the Commission would mount significant resistance. The EU should remain an ally of Polish democracy, maintaining pressure on PiS. The waning of Russian influence is relevant. In recent decades, Moscow has been the key sponsor of CEE authoritarianism – once, there were concerns that PiS would strengthen links with Russia – but the Ukraine debacle has undermined this.
Of course, October’s election is crucial. The record of PiS is lamentable and a third term would entail further damage to democracy. But the vote may not be existential.
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I think PiS often get mis-characterised in English language media.
Some of what they've tried to do has been necessary, just done badly - like the judicial reforms.
PiS aren't really a far right party at all, they're essentially a Catholic nationalist party who hover somewhere around the centre left on economics. The problem is that they have a mentality of trying to get as much personal gain as they can, and often in a very transparent and grabby manner.
PiS are certainly not undemocratic, and considering they are so beholden to German business and EU money their actual policies are nowhere near as illiberal as the media headlines seem. They have overseen a huge rise in non-European migration, their 500+ program hasn't really done anything for the birth rate and institutional opposition to imposed Western values has fallen away.
It's strange to see people linking them to Russia - whilst an "illiberal coalition" with Putin might seem logical from the outside, all areas of Polish politics and the Polish populace have a deep distrust of Russia and an overwhelmingly Atlantacist look at foreign policy. Mind you, I see the same pundits suggest Poland should occupy Lwow which is an equally inappropriate idea and one far from the mainstream of Polish thought.
Poland has long lacked much in the way of civil society, and I even used to cooperate with an NGO aimed at developing organisations and promoting civil society there. As with many things, it was bringing a left leaning Western viewpoint to a uniquely Polish situation so had little impact.
PO themselves were also manifestly corrupt and incompetent during their administration. Lots of financial scandals come to mind, like AmberGold.
It's also worth looking at any Polish issue through the lens of Poland A, B and C. The division between east and west is cultural, not linguistic or ethnic as in Ukraine. The richer western part of Poland is generally more liberal than the poorer eastern part. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland_A_and_B
The apparent rise of the so-called populist ‘right’ in Europe may be because of the repeated failure of the main legacy parties to implement the policies that the people really want. The legacy political parties have evolved into a managerialist monolithic in the major countries of Europe and indeed in the US and Canada too.
The leaders of the main legacy political parties are the pseudo elites of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and UK too, they are not addressing the real wants and needs of the people, in no way they are truly liberal, nor even neoliberal.
In Europe the failure to deliver on the basic needs of the people in defence and law and order, the open borders policies and the internal denigration of national interests have made the peoples weary of the deception that has been played upon them; all encourage by the anti-democratic EU that is the personification of the managerialist class. See especially the writings of Angelo Codevilla, for example at https://spectator.org/americas-ruling-class/ .