Labour is getting it right on immigration

Almost eighteen months into the Starmer government, immigration has emerged as a major topic of debate. Predictable attacks have emanated from the right, but comprehensive objections have also come from the liberal-left. Aside from being illiberal, the liberal-left argues that the government’s immigration policy is electorally counterproductive.

Sophisticated critiques of the electoral efficiency of Labour’s position cite two types of empirical studies. Firstly, there are international studies of the response of mainstream parties to the radical right. Though some argue that such studies demonstrate that social-democratic concessions to the radical right backfire, I need more convincing. Key studies tend not to arrive at firm conclusions about the influence of immigration salience and mainstream concessions. Indeed, one study finds that concessions to voters who have defected to the radical right can work, albeit at a high price. Older literature also suggests that mainstream concessions to niche parties can be effective.

Secondly, there are studies of the profiles of voters who supported Labour in the 2024 general election. Reflecting their narrower focus, these studies paint a clearer picture. In an important piece which uses data from the May 2025 British Election Study (BES), Jane Green and Marta Miori show that low proportions of Labour’s 2024 voting bloc are potential Reform switchers,

‘The vast majority of 2024 Labour voters and those lost since the election to other parties and “undecided” are not predisposed to vote for Reform… few Reform supporters have voted for Labour at any point in the 21^st century… just after May’s 2025 local elections, 18.9% of 2024 Labour voters said they were undecided, 9.4% would vote Liberal Democrat, 8.3% would vote Green, and just 7.9% said they would vote for Reform UK.’

But whatever the clarity of these data, strategic implications are not straightforward. Presently, Labour is performing very poorly in the polls – recent polls have put them as low as 17% and left-liberal critics regularly cite such results – but I am unconvinced that more liberal strategies would be more electorally successful.

Currently, incumbency in Britain is very challenging. Beyond the difficult economic conditions, low partisan identification has made party support more volatile; recent Conservative governments also suffered from this problem. Being in government entails making unpopular decisions and, even if Labour were adopting more liberal stances on immigration, they would probably be losing left-wing votes on issues such as the economy and Gaza war. Every previous Labour government has had bitter left-wing critics.

Generally, voters do not adopt liberal positions on immigration. According to the latest BES data, the mean score for British voters on a 0-10 self-reporting immigration attitudes scale (with liberal views scored high) is 3.11. Fewer than 20% of voters report above 5 and, even among (self-identified) left-wingers, the mean is only 5.18. Moreover, few left-wingers seem to be very concerned about immigration, only 6.05% identifying it as a most important issue; for right-wingers, the figure is 38.88%. This is consistent with YouGov’s regular polling, even if, as a British Social Attitudes report shows, voters take more liberal positions on specific policies.

Arguably, critics overlook the pressure for more restrictive policies from Labour MPs. If one is a Downsian – and much of political science is predicated on this – one must acknowledge the tendency for party positions to reflect voter preferences. Why are many Labour MPs, with their full mailboxes and careers on the line, recommending more restrictive positions? Their views may not be infallible, yet cannot be dismissed lightly.

Of course, arguments about electoral efficiency are complemented by arguments about ethics; left-liberals have long made cases for open and humane immigration policies. Recently, such arguments have responded to developments on the right. In the past year, right-wing rhetoric has become considerably harder. Calls for the deportation of legal migrants, once confined to fringes, now appear with alarming frequency. The rise of Reform reflects such radicalization but, potentially more significantly, parts of the Conservative Party have begun to adopt it. Recently, Katie Lam, a Home Office shadow minister and rising Conservative star, proposed that legally settled immigrants should be deported to make the country ‘culturally coherent’. I share left-liberal concerns about such discourse and policies and wish for these trends to be reversed. For me, it is personal; my wife is a Polish immigrant with settled status.

Coupling ethical concerns with their reading of the electoral situation, certain left-liberals advocate unequivocal responses. In a stimulating and widely-read piece on ‘reactionary centrism’, Toby Buckle cautions against accommodation,

‘This desire to meet the hard right halfway, to find a middle point, is hopelessly exploitable. In an age of radicalisation, you simply get pulled further and further to the right, while tacitly validating those values at every step… Affluent countries the world over are balkanising into fascist and anti-fascist factions. One must simply pick a side… Starmer is—though you would never guess it—the captain of the liberal team. His job is not to find consensus, but to hold his own coalition together.’

Yet this is not social-democratic language. Traditionally, social democrats seek compromise and, in this area, there is a strong case for it. As we have seen, immigration is broadly unpopular in Britain. High rates of recent immigration can scarcely be ignored. According to the Office for National Statistics, net migration for the year ending June 2023 was over 900,000. This was a steep rise on previous years and is excessive. Left-liberal critics of Starmer could be more specific about figures. Is there a level of immigration which would be too high and electorally counterproductive? If so, what is it?

Left-liberal complaints about the right-wing media are common – in Buckle’s article, they feature prominently – yet are unconvincing. Not only do such arguments tend to overstate the role of media – to a great extent, the media reflects public opinion – but right-wing media is a long-term feature of the British political environment and must be factored into strategy.

In these conditions, the government’s existing policies to reduce immigration, such as those set out in May’s immigration white paper and the steps against unauthorised migration, appear broadly reasonable, as does the appointment of Shabana Mahmood as Home Secretary. Combined with opposition to radical right-wing discourse – the recent remarks of Starmer and Mahmood about Reform, in contrast to the ill-judged ‘island of strangers’ speech, have been important – such a strategy should give Labour its best chance of realizing its long-term goal: a 2029 election which is fought on public services and the economy, rather than immigration.

Quite aside from the electoral interests of the Labour Party, this may be in the national interest. Historically, British policymakers have prized moderation and judicious concessions. Currently, the topic of immigration cries out for such an approach; parts of society are highly dissatisfied and there is risk of disorder. I have not been optimistic about the ability of the Starmer project to transcend electoral self-interest, yet perhaps incumbency is exerting such an influence.

I hope, at least, that this is the case. In our polarized times, moderation has become unfashionable; but in this area, it seems more necessary than ever.

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