Over the weekend, I went to the Battle of Ideas festival in London. This annual event embraces intellectual diversity and is associated with the ‘heterodox’ movement which is critical of liberal political and cultural establishments. Last year, I was also at the festival and wrote this review.
On Saturday afternoon, I attended a session on academic freedom. This panel was very interesting and comprised Bryn Harris (the Free Speech Union), Helen Joyce (a gender-critical author and activist), Akua Reindorf (an employment barrister), Michelle Shipworth (a UCL academic), Graham Stringer (a Labour MP) and Jan Macvarish (the Free Speech Union). This is an impressive line-up, though might have featured more academics.
Much of the focus was on the Labour government’s halting of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act. On this, I agree wholeheartedly with the panel; the law should be implemented and Labour’s reasoning is untenable.
But of course, there was wider reflection on the state of academic freedom. Broadly, there was a consensus that a very serious problem exists – though not all panellists addressed the issue – and contributions from the audience echoed this diagnosis. This interpretation, let us call it the ‘maximum’ hypothesis, is common among the heterodox community, including the narrower academic freedom movement. It emphasizes monolithic (progressive) opinion within academic and the victimization of dissenters.
As readers of this Substack know, I certainly agree that considerable problems exist. In recent years, there have been multiple attacks on academic freedom and, crucially, difficult atmospheres force countless others into silence. Pippa Norris, a world-leading political scientist, shows that this reflects ideological balances within societies. In developing countries with conservative cultures, liberal scholars report threats to academic freedom. In developed countries with liberal cultures (i.e. Western ones), conservative scholars report such threats. Importantly, this interpretation explains recent problems in the West; as these countries have become more liberal (and stratified), dissenters have encountered greater difficulties.
However, the mere existence of such trends does not vindicate the maximum hypothesis; academia is highly diverse. Arguably, the humanities and qualitative social sciences deserve a category of their own. Whilst such departments are more heterogeneous than many suppose, the predominance of social justice perspectives and the political/activist nature of much research entails real problems; dissent can have serious consequences and many scholars remain silent.
Yet the quantitative social sciences and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) subjects are different. In these departments, subjects tend to be less political, scholar-activists are almost entirely absent and academics are more politically diverse. This does not mean that such faculties are free of problems – for example, there have been rows over EDI initiatives in STEM – yet they tend to be very different from the first category.
Of course, there are major internal differences within both categories. In some fields/departments, dominant figures might act as enforcers of new orthodoxies and create chilling atmospheres. In others, such figures might be staunch defenders of academic freedom and create relaxed atmospheres. Not all academics think ideologically, even in the humanities, and many seldom reflect on academic freedom.
Loss of contact with the realities of the sector is a real danger. On the one hand, commentators who do not work in the sector run this risk. Of course, not being an academic does not mean that one cannot have an opinion on universities – for multiple reasons, such a demand is unreasonable – but non-academics should take extra care to resist stereotypes.
On the other hand, many of the academics who speak out on academic freedom have faced real and horrifying restrictions themselves. Notwithstanding the importance of these cases, there is a danger of fixating on them and drawing general conclusions. As methodologists caution, one should not select on the dependent variable.
Some will disagree with this assessment. This is natural and desirable; people have different opinions and the academic freedom movement exists to encourage diversity of opinion. Yet I worry about certain sources of demand for the maximum hypothesis. Academia has become a major part of the culture war. Every day, universities are the subject of headlines and many who have minimal experience of the sector consume these stories. Resultingly, some want conditions in universities to be as bad as possible as this perpetuates narratives about liberal outgroups and mobilizes supporters.
Proportional analysis of the problem is entirely consistent with defence of academic freedom. Though single-issue campaigns attract people who have strong views on causes, this does not necessarily benefit these movements. Broader support for such causes may be more nuanced and, by adopting stringent positions, movements can alienate potential supporters. In UK academia, the UCU trade union has long suffered from this problem.
Admittedly, the maximum hypothesis has a tactical logic. If one acknowledges the limits of a problem, one risks lessening interest in it; multiple topics compete for the attention of politicians and journalists. Therefore, some might think it better to err on the side of overstatement.
Yet overemphasis plays into the hands of those who dismiss concerns about academic freedom. Correctly, such people point out that many parts of academia do not correspond with the maximum hypothesis. Often, this makes it easier to ignore genuine challenges to academic freedom, some people needing little encouragement to do this.
Threats to academic freedom are all too real. Excessive accounts may be tempting, yet I am not sure they are helpful.
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I actually think the problems with academic freedom in science are worse. Not worse in scale, but worse because they are more focussed and because they more directly hinder the search for objective truth.
Thoughtful and nuanced, as usual, Thomas. Thank you.