Britain’s instability problem

During this parliament, one book has proved unusually prescient. Published in 2019 and covering the 2010-17 period, Electoral Shocks argued that declining party identification (or partisan dealignment) had made British politics less stable. Traditionally, high proportions of voters identified with parties and could be relied upon for support. But the decline of this factor - for reasons peculiar to post-industrial societies - entails greater instability. For example, the collapse of the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 election reflected their lack of partisans.

Since 2017, this trend has continued. Using data from the British Election Study, the figure below shows party identification during this parliament. Strong partisanship has ebbed and the proportion of voters who have no party identification has grown. In the next year, the trend may relent – during elections, voters tend to become more loyal – yet the long-term trajectory is clear.  

This helps explain the probable result of this year’s election. The Conservative Party has governed poorly; but rather than a 1997 style defeat, the party faces meltdown. Some cite the 1993 Canadian election, in which the governing Progressive Conservative Party was reduced to two seats. At every stage of the current parliament, partisan dealignment has made governing harder. For example, the polling declines which brought about the end of Johnson and Truss – and, ironically, perpetuated instability – would have been less extreme had party identification been higher.  

The trend is set to be a permanent feature of British politics. Even if Labour achieves a large majority at this year’s election, the party may struggle to win consecutive majorities, as it might have done years ago. The economy is poor and the electorate is angry; the polls may change quickly. As with the Conservatives, a large majority is no protection against internal strife. If polls are volatile, Labour will suffer divisions.   

In a recent article about the UK, the Economist were positive about partisan dealignment, arguing that it reduced tribalism. I am less optimistic. Academic literature associates partisan dealignment with negative outcomes, the phenomenon long being the bane of regions such as Central and Eastern Europe. This is obvious; instability tends to be a negative force and, in the UK, volatility associated with the Truss government was disastrous.

In the UK, there are specific issues. Concurrently, affective polarization has increased; this entails dislike of outgroups, such as Remainers or Brexiters. Of course, this reflects wider developments, such as the growth of social media and decline of legacy media.

This may be the worst of both worlds. Voters need guidance; the majority do not have the time or inclination to follow politics closely and some lack sophistication. Therefore, voters require heuristics, mental shortcuts for the positions they should adopt. Traditionally, parties provide these heuristics and, whatever their shortcomings, are good at this; literature shows that strong parties are a predictor of the quality of liberal democracy.

As partisan identification has waned and affective polarization has grown, new sources provide heuristics. For example, partisan journalists and social media accounts are popular. As this Substack has argued, these sources tend not to improve our political culture, spreading misinformation and vulgarity.

Partisan dealignment may not be a necessary condition for this – in the US, party identification endures yet political discourse has also cheapened – but scarcely helps. In the UK, competition between parties and new opinion formers encourages a race to the bottom. For example, certain parliamentary interventions aim for exposure on social media and, in their quality, scarcely rival parliament’s greats.

This is relevant to debates about electoral reform. Given the capacity of first-past-the-post (FPTP) to promote stability, partisan dealignment may be an extra argument for retaining the system. In proportional systems with low party identification, politics can be fragmented and chaotic.

Then again, FPTP can facilitate dramatic swings. Should the Conservative Party win less than 25% of the vote in the next election, it will probably win a small proportion of seats. The Liberal Democrats have long suffered this problem.       

Britain remains in a period of transition. Brexit is recent and institutions are adjusting to new political and cultural realities. Many of us long for a period of calm. Alas, partisan dealignment may mean a long wait.   

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