After a break, I am happy to announce the return of this Substack. Along with my co-author Edmund G. C. King, I have (all but) finished a book. Beyond Woke and Anti-Woke: Explaining the Rise of Social Justice Ideology will be published by Bristol University Press in February 2026. The book is predicated on the belief that social justice ideology – an ideology which emphasizes identity and direct action and extends the concept of harm – merits academic study with the use of statistical methods and engagement with academic literatures, just like ideologies such as radical right populism. Soon, I will provide more information. But today, I wanted to set the scene, with reference to a thought-provoking essay which appeared last week.
In an excellent piece, the Leiden political economist Alexandre Afonso discusses the supply and demand of right-wing academics. Afonso notes that such academics are undersupplied within academia, reflecting well-known factors such as the relationship between education and left-liberal values. Yet within media spaces, there is equal demand for right and left-wing academic commentators, reflecting the need for balanced representation of the public’s views. This creates distinct incentives. Given the rewards of media coverage and paucity of right-wing scholars, some may adapt their views to meet this demand. For radical right positions, the effect is more pronounced. Sizable proportions of the public hold such views, yet very few academics do and, for scholars who espouse these positions, rewards can be considerable.
Afonso’s essay made me reflect. Certainly, such incentives are a problem. Beyond the narrower issue of media exposure, there is a wider contrarian/reactionary ecosystem; scholars who are critical of ‘wokeness’ enjoy considerable social media followings, book sales and access to politicians. As we argue in our book, this has distorted the study of social justice ideology; the most prominent accounts are polemical, fail to engage with academic debates and lack empirical evidence. Crucially, they do not respond to the incentive structures of academic fields (see below), but to those of popular audiences.
Yet Afonso does not reflect on the influence of differences in the supply and demand of right-wingers on academic fields themselves. Notwithstanding the importance of media engagement, such fields are the basic unit of academia. The spatial hypothesis states that gaps in research agendas drives the output of fields, akin to markets in neoclassical economic theory. For example, the hypothesis that immigration consolidates the welfare state creates the need for the counter-hypothesis that immigration undermines the welfare state.
Some use the spatial hypothesis to defend academia against charges of left-wing bias, i.e. fields dictate the structure of output and the political views of academics are irrelevant. But as Afonso acknowledges, it is not as simple as this. In an academia in which left-liberals are in the majority, the adoption of contrary positions can entail professional and social penalties.
In any case, I have problems with the spatial hypothesis (as I have problems with neoclassical economics). Rather than reflecting the interplay of supply and demand, fields follow path-dependent logics. The postulation of contrary theories can be more difficult - given the established profile of extant theories, it is easier to produce work which builds on existing assumptions – and the undersupply of right-wing scholars compounds such difficulties.
One sees this logic in political science. Arguably, there is an oversupply of studies of radical right populism. Such parties have limited electoral support – in Europe, their ceiling is about 20/25% of the popular vote and they seldom lead governments – yet their study occupies much more space in academic journals and conferences.
Other sub-fields suffer – the studies of social democracy, conservatism and liberalism have comparatively small profiles – yet, in our book, we argue that the study of social justice ideology has been a particular casualty. Beyond the path-dependent commitment of resources to fields such as radical right populism, the prevalence of left-liberal values within academia entails a reluctance to interrogate certain parts of the political spectrum; humans tend to regard their own beliefs as self-evident and not requiring explanation. Of course, this reluctance also reflects the influence of popular contrarians. Such commentators have cornered this market and, for some academics, have sullied the mere study of such topics.
But as I have long argued on this Substack, social justice ideology is worthy of serious study. Clearly distinct from liberalism (which emphasizes freedom and gradualism), social justice ideology also differs from traditional left-wing ideologies, emphasizing identity-based oppression rather than class-based exploitation. Its rise (and arguable recent retreat) is fascinating and, in our view, merits an academic field which, rather than following the logic of popular-orientated contrarianism, adopts scholarly conventions.
In the book, we try to develop this field, building on the work of other scholars who attempt this. Evidently, social justice reflects demographic changes, our analysis of multiple UK and US datasets revealing consistent associations with female gender, education and youth. But contrary to received wisdom, we find little quantitative evidence of a relationship between social justice ideology and declining economic conditions. Nonetheless, our qualitative analysis suggests that post-2008 crises of capitalism acted as catalysts for ideological change. Economic crises discredited liberalism among younger groups and, for corporations, the embrace of social justice ideology provided renewed legitimacy. By the 2020s, social justice ideology had become a major rival to liberalism and, despite the attacks of the second Trump administration, it remains a major force in progressive politics.
I hope this has whetted appetites. Over the next few weeks and months, I will reveal more details.
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The political monoculture in western academia is easily noticed if you follow the output of psychology papers. I'm routinely astonished by how little academic work is published pathologising anyone but men and conservatives. My sample for this is the daily Psypost news feed, which itself may be left-based, of course.
This sounds excellent Thomas - I look forward to it!